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Abstract This paper explores gender and mental health with particular reference
to the emerging philosophical field of critical realism. This philosophy
suggests a shared ontology and epistemology for the natural and social
sciences. Until recently, most of the debate surrounding gender and
mental health has been guided either implicitly or explicitly within a
positivist or constructivist philosophy. With this in mind, key areas of
critical realism are explored in relation to gender and mental health, and
contrasted with the positions of positivism and constructivism. It is
argued that critical realism offers an alternative philosophical frame-
work for the exploration of gender issues within mental health care.
Keywords: critical realism, positivism, mental health, constructivism,
gender, ontology and epistemology.
Introduction
Current gender studies not only explore the division
between masculine and feminine they also challenge
the division between ‘gender neutral’ and ‘gendered’
(Holter, 2005). In other words, ‘gender neutral’ fails to
acknowledge the similarities and diversities that exist
among and between men and women. The growing
literature surrounding gender identifies complexities
in the gender order (Connell, 1987, 2000, 2002, 2005;
Butler, 1990, 2004; Brod & Kaufman, 1994; Lorber,
1994; Mac an Ghaill, 1996;Whitehead, 2002; Kimmel,
2004;Kimmel & Messner, 2004) with ‘gender as diver-
sity’ as opposed to ‘gender-as-difference’ now emerg-
ing as a central theme (Annandale & Hunt, 2000,
p. 25). Connell (2002) argues most people combine
masculinity and femininity in differing ways. He uses
the term ‘gender order’ to refer to the ‘structural
inventory of an entire society’, i.e. the historically
created arrangements of power relations for men and
women (Connell, 1987, p. 99). This evolving complex-
ity in the gender order with a multiplicity of mascu-
linities and femininities challenges the business of
mental health related research and practice.
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Gender is a key sociocultural influence on health
(Courtenay, 2000) and a critical determinant of
mental health. It is suggested that strategies for reduc-
ing risk in mental health cannot be gender neutral as
the risks are gender specific (World Health Organisa-
tion, 2001). Arguably the social and biomedical
domains of mental health and illness should be linked
through an interdisciplinary research approach that
clarifies and understands the terms ‘sex’, ‘gender’,
and ‘gender difference’ (World Health Organisation,
2004). Therefore, a health strategy based on such a
knowledge base requires a movement towards a
more ‘gender sensitive approach’ (Miers, 2000, 2002;
Khoury & Weisman, 2002; World Health Organisa-
tion, 2004;Women’s Health Council, 2005a, 2005b).
This paper explores these issues with particular ref-
erence to the emerging philosophical field of critical
realism. Critical realism is considered a ‘third way’
between positivism and relativism (Wainwright &
Forbes, 2000; Danermark et al., 2002; Robson, 2002)
and possesses an ‘emancipatory’ potential for mental
health care research and practice (Wainwright &
Forbes, 2000;Williams, 2003).This potential is evident
through the ‘double inclusiveness’ of critical realism,
insofar as it has the capacity to include the insights of
other metatheoretical perspectives without reducing
our understanding to their biased and somewhat
limited positions; to a view of the world that ontologi-
cally goes further to include multiple domains of
reality – the empirical, actual, and real (Bhaskar &
Danermark, 2006). In this regard, this paper explores
and contrasts Bhaskar’s (1978, 1989) distinctive fea-
tures of realism. The concepts gender, mental health
and illness are explored with some possibilities for
critical realism as an alternative framework offered.
Critical realism
Critical realism is a relatively new philosophical
approach that suggests a shared ontology and episte-
mology for the natural and social sciences (Sayer,
1992). It claims to merge and resolve ‘ontological
realism, epistemological relativism, and judgmental
rationality’ (Archer et al., 1998, p. xi).The term critical
realism evolved from the expressions ‘transcendental
realism’ and ‘critical naturalism’ (Archer et al., 1998)
with the ‘critical’ component similar to a ‘transcen-
dental’ notion of ontology that moves beyond what is
immediately evident or experienced, similar to Kant’s
philosophy of transcendental idealism. However,
realism reveals differences from transcendental ideal-
ism, in particular, an external and independent reality
exists that is separate to our perceptions and under-
standings (Collier, 1994; Danermark et al., 2002).
The philosophical basis of critical realism has been
largely associated with the British philosophers
Roy Bhaskar and his mentor Rom Harré, with
more recent contributors, including the works of
Archer (1995), Collier (1994), Danermark et al.
(2002) Lawson (1997), Manicas (1987), Outhwaite
(1987) and Sayer (1992, 2000). Bhaskar (1978, 1989)
promotes a transcendental argument to put forward a
realist approach to science. Included among the dis-
tinctive features of his account of realism are (1)
reality as differentiated and stratified; (2) causality,
generative mechanisms and emergence; and (3) the
intransitive and transitive aspects of knowledge.
These three features will be used to explore critical
realism as a potential philosophical framework for
the study of gender and mental health. This provides
a more inclusive understanding for gender and
mental health that goes beyond positivism and
constructivism.
Reality as differentiated and stratified: beyond
positivism and constructivism
Critical realism is first and foremost concerned with
ontology and starts from questions about what exists.
As Bhaskar (1978) argues, a philosophy of reality
must begin with a theory ‘of being’ (ontology) as dis-
tinct from a theory ‘of knowledge’ (epistemology).
Having identified what ‘is’ or what exists, critical
realism then moves to focus on questions concerning
the creation of knowledge about that existence
(Frauley & Pearce, 2007).This is a key difference that
distinguishes critical realism from other metatheoreti-
cal positions. Furthermore, Bhaskar (1998) suggests
that reality is differentiated and stratified. Three dif-
ferent domains of the social and natural world are
distinguished; the real, the actual, and the empirical.
These three domains need to be briefly outlined and
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how mechanisms events and experiences are repre-
sented and overlap via these domains.
Realist domains of reality
Sayer (2000) outlines two points in relation to the real
domain. First, it is all that exists (natural or social)
despite whether we experience it or not or have
knowledge of its disposition. Second, it is the ‘realm of
objects, their structures and powers’ (p. 11) that can
produce events in the world and it is the transitive
aspect of science to identify this realm. It is in this
domain that mechanisms (what makes something
happen in the world) events and experiences exist.
The actual domain refers to what happens in reality
when the powers or mechanisms of the real are acti-
vated, and events and experiences are produced
(Collier, 1994; Sayer, 2000; Danermark et al., 2002).
The empirical domain is comprised only of what we
experience (directly or indirectly); however, not all
events are experienced (Collier, 1994).The domain of
the real is distinct and greater than the empirical
domain. However, the empirical is in a ‘contingent
relation’ to the domains of the actual and the real
(Outhwaite, 1998).
Therefore, a realist ontology acknowledges that
powers may exist that are not yet exercised.A feature
of reality is that ‘there is an ontological gap between
what we experience and understand, what really
happens, and – most important – the deep dimension
where the mechanisms are [real domain] which
produce the events’ (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 39).
This has the potential to allow us to understand how
we could be from that which we currently are not; e.g.
oppression/controlled versus freedom (Sayer, 2000),
or from being mentally healthy to mentally ill. For
instance, we may experience and have an understand-
ing of a mental illness; however, realist ontology
allows us the opportunity to explore independently
such illness within the domain of the real and to dis-
cover the generative mechanisms that may be produc-
ing such an illness (event).
Reality as stratified
Reality is also viewed as being stratified, whereby
generative mechanisms belong to different layers or
strata of reality (Collier, 1994). For example, strata
can include the ‘physical’, ‘chemical’, ‘biological’,
‘psychological’, ‘social’, ‘economic’ . . . among others
(Bhaskar, 1978, p. 119). It is this stratified ontology
that differentiates critical realism from other ontolo-
gies, in so far as they only engage the actual or the
empirical domains of reality with no recognition of an
independent reality. This real domain is beyond what
we experience or observe and has powers that can
be activated or not (Sayer, 2000). This stratification
allows new mechanisms to be created that are
referred to as emergent powers (Danermark et al.,
2002). In keeping with these stratified principles,
two or more features of the world may combine to
produce a new event or experience; however, such
occurrences can not be reduced to their components
only, even though such components are necessary for
their being. A much cited example is water and it
being quite different from its components, for hydro-
gen and oxygen are highly flammable (Sayer, 2000).
Positivism is based on an understanding that reality
is objective, tangible and singular and experiences are
what can be observed – a science that is value free
(Robson, 2002). It attempts to find regularly occurring
events or patterns in order to generate predictions.
Popper’s (1959) notion of science as hypothetico-
deductivewith the falsification of hypotheses is critical
for a knowledge of reality. A key principle in the
delineation of theory as scientific or non-scientific is
whether propositions are tested with efforts made to
refute them (Crotty, 1998). On the other hand, con-
structivism, as a dominant position within sociology,
holds a fundamental belief that ‘reality is not self-
evident, stable and waiting to be discovered, but . . . a
product of human activity’ (Rogers & Pilgrim, 2005,
p. 15). This reality is socially constructed and what
exists is dependent upon a person’s interpretation and
understandingof that reality (ormultiple realities) and
it’s socially produced knowledge (Guba & Lincoln,
1994). This creates a tendency towards an ‘epistemo-
logical relativism’ and a ‘judgemental relativism’ (the
notion that we cannot have satisfactory criteria for
selecting which knowledge is more appropriate and
closer to the truth than others); e.g. theories cannot be
falsified.However, critical realist ontology (differenti-
ated and stratified) challenges both a relativist
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tendency and a positivist reductionist approach
(Bhaskar, 1978, 1986; Sayer, 2000). This argument is
further advanced from a health perspective.
Much research into health has often failed to
understand inequalities within a complex social
world (Popay et al., 1998;Williams, 2003). There is an
epistemological limitation evident here, in terms of
positivists confusing prediction (and description)
with both causation and explanation (Forbes &
Wainwright, 2001; Frauley & Pearce, 2007). Also,
constructivism has limitations, especially in its pro-
liferation of the linguistic fallacy where the ‘being’
is reduced to our discourse only, and also, the
epistemic fallacy that suggests that ‘being’ can be
reduced to or analysed in terms of our knowledge
only (Bhaskar, 1978). Critics suggest that construc-
tivism is unable to consider the social world as
greater than people’s interpretations of it, to a social
world that also includes structural and institutional
aspects that are in some ways independent of an
individuals thinking (Pawson & Tilley, 1997).
Williams (2003, p. 52) suggests that constructivism
is ‘falling prey to the epistemic fallacy’ and cites
‘disease, for example, . . . is patently more than just a
social construct, however important the latter might
be. Disease labels . . . describe but do not constitute
disease. The reality of disease . . . is not exhausted by
our descriptions of it. If only it were!’ With this in
mind, mental health and illness is often portrayed
through various paradoxical positions, and it is often
quite difficult to determine what theories are more
factual and real (Littlejohn, 2003). Moreover, within
both psychiatric classification systems (Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders DSM-
IV and the International Classification of Disease
ICD-10), diagnostic categories and their knowledge
base are often challenged and disputed, as some
tend to appear and disappear over time (Manning,
2001).
Additionally, Carpenter (2000) in arguing for the
development of a critical realist framework for the
study of gender inequalities of health, cautions
against the pitfall of the anthropic fallacy and con-
structivism.This fallacy and the ensuing anthropocen-
tric bias explains ‘being in terms of human being’ only
(Bhaskar, 1998, p. 642), and this hinders an under-
standing of the complex relations, of and between, the
natural and the social and its potential impact on
mental health and illness.
Causality: beyond positivism and
constructivism
Critical realism is both analytical and critical of the
social practices it studies, and also, of the existing
theories that explain such practices (Sayer, 2000;
Robson, 2002). Sometimes social practices can be
based upon existing theories that may be real or not,
e.g. gender and the natural attitude (gender as a
natural expansion of sex). If gender relations are
understood only as something that is natural as
opposed to a product of socialization, then explana-
tions of inequality are also viewed as natural or bio-
logically determined, understandings that are not
totally real and potentially fallible (Sayer, 2000).
Equally, what is portrayed as mental illness by the
medical profession influences our understanding
(Payne, 2006) and subsequent care. As already
stated, such understandings are often challenged and
disputed, as some illnesses tend to disappear over
time. If such accounts and their actions are identified
as being inconsistent, potentially inaccurate or
untrue, then a stimulus for change is offered (Sayer,
2000).
Sayer (1992) suggests that many have held the
view that if individuals (micro) were more clearly
understood, then the configurations of society
(macro) could be greatly realized, a view that is
challenged as being quite ambiguous. For instance,
Sayer (1992) points to the fact that we cannot
explain a person’s ability to think by mere reference
to the cells that constitute the person. The fact that
the properties of the components of an entity, e.g.
water (hydrogen and oxygen) cannot explain their
combined effect suggests that the world is not only
differentiated (domains) but also stratified (Sayer,
1992; Danermark et al., 2002). Causality from a criti-
cal realist perspective is the process of ‘identifying
causal mechanisms and how they work, and discov-
ering if they have been activated and under what
conditions’ (Sayer, 2000, p. 14). Realists, therefore
look beyond what is directly observable within the
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domain of the empirical, to what is not there with
equal and often more importance and endeavour to
offer more comprehensive explanations (Danermark
et al., 2002). Whereas positivists focus on ‘cause-
effect’ relations through lawful patterns of thinking
(Sarantakos, 1993) – a ‘successionist’ view of causal-
ity; realists redefine laws so that they are better
understood as explanatory and non-predictively
normic (events being the outcome of mechanism
interplay); rather than being ‘constant conjunctures
of events’ (Potter & López, 2001, p. 10). In contrast,
constructivism explores complex individualized
social realities and therefore view causality as the
process of constructing meaning that is a result of
human activity that does not occur in a linear
way (Appleton & King, 2002; Rogers & Pilgrim,
2005).
An example of critical realism being critical of the
social practices it studies is around the area of health
inequalities. Because of the philosophical constraints
of positivism and constructivism, factors that are
often invisible to existence, not capable of being
measured or not expressed by the researched are
quite often missed during the research process
(Wainwright & Forbes, 2000;Williams, 2003). Critical
realism addresses this by initially trying to under-
stand, and more importantly, attempting to produce
in-depth explanations of the ‘causal mechanisms’
and how they exert effect and if they have been trig-
gered and under what circumstances they have been
activated (Sayer, 2000). For example, Wainwright &
Forbes (2000) outline the importance of power rela-
tions and health inequalities. They suggest that
ignoring or failing to explore underlying mechanisms
within capitalism, such as exploitation or alienation,
can result in partial and weak explanations only for
health inequalities. To address these issues requires
realist questions that engage ‘counterfactual think-
ing’ (fundamental to retroduction) that assists to
‘distinguish between what can be the case and what
must be the case, given certain preconditions’
(Sayer, 2000, p. 16). This approach offers a frame-
work for greater understanding of how gender and
the multiplicity of masculinities (hegemony, subordi-
nation, marginalization, complicity) (Connell, 2005)
and femininities can impact on the mental health
of individuals. The gendered patterns of mental
illness and inequalities between men and women are
explored later.
Intransitive and transitive dimensions
of knowledge
Critical realism argues that science is a social product
(Sayer, 1992), and makes a fundamental distinction
between two dimensions of knowledge, namely, the
intransitive and transitive (Bhaskar, 1998; Sayer, 2000;
Danermark et al., 2002). From a realist perspective,
science aims to understand this intransitive dimension
of reality through socially produced theories (transi-
tive) that are potentially fallible and limited. In other
words, the intransitive refers to the real entities or
objects of scientific knowledge that constitute the
natural and social world (Outhwaite, 1987). It can
include and extend to all that exists (ontology)
(Bhaskar, 1978). The transitive includes the estab-
lished facts, theories, models, paradigms, and tech-
niques of inquiry available to a particular scientific
discipline or individual (Bhaskar, 1998) – the episte-
mological (Danermark et al., 2002). Such theories,
models and paradigms may compete and challenge
each other; however, the world that they are about
(intransitive) remains constant (Collier, 1994). In
other words, although our understanding and theories
(transitive) of the world may change, this does not
necessarily mean that the world or reality (intransi-
tive) that they are about changes also (Sayer, 2000).
This is particularly true in relation to the natural
world; however, the social world is more complex as it
is socially constructed and cannot independently exist
without some knowledge (Sayer, 2000). In this
regard, Bhaskar’s (1998) Transformational Model of
Social Activity and Archer’s (1995) Morphogenetic
Approach view both structure and agent as separate
strata and neither can be ‘reduced to, explained in
terms of, or reconstructed from the other. There is an
ontological hiatus between society and people, as well
as a mode of connection (viz. transformation) . . .’
(Bhaskar, 1998, p. 37). This connection may limit the
actions of agents through existing structures, and
simultaneously such actions may replicate or change
social structures (Danermark et al., 2002), whereby
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the ontological or intransitive reality of the social
world is changed.As Sayer (1992, p. 119) notes, social
structures (gender) may exist only where people
(re)construct them; however, their powers are often
‘irreducible’ to those people. For that reason an
understanding of individuals sometimes requires a
‘macro regress’ to the social institutions in which they
are situated, as well as a ‘micro regress’. Therefore,
when we study the social world we need to explore
the interplay of both (Danermark et al., 2002).
According to Bhaskar (1998) constructivism col-
lapses the intransitive dimension of ‘being’ to a dis-
course about ‘being’ – the ‘linguistic fallacy’. In other
words, it fails to recognize that there is more to reality
than what is articulated through the language of indi-
viduals (Wainwright, 1997). With this in mind, Bus-
field (2001) highlights a philosophical difficulty with
social constructivism and mental illness, whereby con-
cerns regarding the language of social constructs and
mental illness may lead some (service users, provid-
ers, and families) to resist such understandings as they
may feel such language does not fully accept the real
difficulties and suffering (pain) involved with a
mental illness. In this regard, critical realism accepts
the premise that mental illness exists within our dis-
course; however, what denotes or constitutes such
illness may exist beyond our discourse. This under-
standing would allow for a fallibility of our knowledge
and understanding (Sayer, 2000) about what consti-
tutes any particular mental illness and justifies a posi-
tion of a world (mental illness) that is independent of
what we may think it to be.
From a health perspective, constructivism has
made significant contributions in explaining health
inequalities and how people construct meaningful
understandings of their health (Wainwright & Forbes,
2000). A view that reality could be external of our
beliefs and knowledge is denied, while positivism, on
the other hand, tries to distinguish between knowl-
edge that is objective, empirical and verifiable (value
neutral science) and knowledge that is not (Crotty,
1998; Robson, 2002). However, some limitations for
an understanding of mental health and illness from
these perspectives have been outlined with the poten-
tial for a critical realist framework presented. This
potential is explored further.
Explanations of mental health and
illness: possibilities for critical realism
Traditionally, sociological and biological explana-
tions for health and illness have often assumed
polarized positions (Bird & Rieker, 1999). In recent
times, the literature on how sex (biological) and
gender affect the health of both women and men is
expanding (Payne, 2006), with an understanding that
neither one alone influences mental health and
illness. Carpenter (2000) argues that a critical realist
framework has potential for research on health and
illness; however, this has yet to be achieved. He sug-
gests that this is a suitable process for achieving a
balance between ‘. . . structure and process, and
analysis of biology and culture . . .’ (p. 47), and sug-
gests that a realist framework facilitates this process
of amalgamation of knowledge because it makes no
basic distinctions between the importance of medi-
cine and sociology.
Mental illness in both women and men draws on
‘sex’ and ‘gender’ based explanations (Payne, 2006).
For example, Scott (2000) in her review of research
into women’s and men’s mental health highlights the
effects of oestrogen (among other possible physi-
ological causes) in the differing psychopathological
profiles of men and women across the life span;
while Emslie et al. (2006) showed how some men
engage aspects of hegemonic masculinity (control,
power, dominance) as part of their recovery from
depression. While for other men conforming to such
masculinity could contribute to suicidal behaviour.
Therefore, gender is significant for mental health
and illness. It influences the power and control men
and women have in relation to their socioeconomic
position, roles, social status, and access to resources
and treatment, and is also critical in determining a
person’s vulnerability and exposure to mental
health risks in society (World Health Organisation,
2001).
Current explanations of mental health
and illness
While the biomedical perspective has been the domi-
nant paradigm for understanding mental health and
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illness (Hannigan & Cutcliffe, 2002), various other
perspectives suggest that the subject area is highly
disputed (e.g. Hollingshead & Redlich, 1958;
Goffman, 1961; Szasz, 1961, 2007; Foucault, 1967;
Laing, 1969; Chesler, 1972; Brown & Harris, 1978;
Scheff, 1981; Penfold &Walker, 1983; Showalter, 1987;
Ussher, 1991; Busfield, 1996). Mental health and
illness is therefore portrayed through various and
sometimes paradoxical positions,making it difficult to
determine what theories are more factual and real
(Littlejohn, 2003).
Social causation theory accepts that major mental
illnesses are valid and real diagnoses and tries to
determine if any associations between social dis-
advantage (poverty, class, gender, age) and mental
illness exist using objective empirical methods
(Rogers & Pilgrim, 2005). For example, depression is
said to occur whereby a set of vulnerability factors
or certain situations are identified (loss, low inti-
macy, class) that may predispose people to psychiat-
ric illness, thus highlighting the importance of social
issues in relation to the causation of mental illness
(Brown & Harris, 1978). Foucault (1967) maintains
that the body is a social construct and focuses his
ideas about mental illness in terms of unreason and
irrationality. His emphasis on the mind as opposed
to the body highlights the claim of mental illness as
a social construct. Ussher’s (1991) exploration of the
concepts gender and ‘madness’ deconstructs both
concepts and recognizes discourses of ‘madness’ and
its connections with other discourses of misogyny,
power, sexuality, and badness. She endeavours to
establish whether women’s ‘madness’ is a ‘misogynis-
tic construct’ or a mental illness. While she does not
provide any single solution, the pervasiveness of
misogyny within patriarchal societies may explain
some of women’s obedience with professional
groups (medicine, psychology) that offer a partial
explanation for mental illness. Although critical
realism encompasses such explanations for mental
illness, partially due to the fact that it accepts a
‘weak’ social constructivist position and also materi-
alist causes; notes, that the socially defined nature of
this knowledge does not suggest that it cannot iden-
tify other external explanations that can be real and
independent of any one person (Sayer, 2000).
Possibilities for critical realism
While the significance of social constructivist lan-
guage and mental illness is acknowledged, in particu-
lar, its challenge to how the body is represented in
medical science, it is argued, however, that it has also
restricted sociological study of mental illness, e.g. the
reality that some people experience severe pain as
a consequence of mental illness (Busfield, 2001;
Mulvany, 2001). Consequently, there is a growing
number within the field of mental health (Green-
wood, 1994; Busfield, 1996, 2001; Pilgrim & Bentall,
1999; Rogers & Pilgrim, 2005), chronic illness and
disability (Williams, 1999; Bhaskar & Danermark,
2006), health (Carpenter, 2000;Wainwright & Forbes,
2000; Forbes & Wainwright, 2001;Williams, 2003) and
research (Danermark, 2002; Danermark et al., 2002;
Robson, 2002; Bhaskar & Danermark, 2006; Down-
ward & Mearman, 2007) that view critical realism as
an alternative framework.
Pilgrim&Bentall (1999) make the case that current
medical views of depression are vague, perplexed and
lacking as a basis for framing mental health difficul-
ties. They argue that current understandings of the
concept ‘depression’ are inadequate as a basis for
research and required therapeutic interventions.
Research into the ‘cognitive and biological mediators
of distress’ require a more restricted research focus,
e.g. areas such as low self-esteem and fatigue. They
also suggest that the concept is deficient for a full
investigation of the social and political circumstances
that contribute to ‘human misery’ and suggest a criti-
cal realist framework as a more informed approach,
as opposed to ‘medical naturalism and social con-
structionism’ (p. 271).
Payne (2006) outlines the mixed evidence that
supports a biological (sex) risk for depression in
men and women and reviews the evidence that links
depression to a number of gendered factors. Daner-
mark (2002) for example, argues that emotions
cannot be understood or explained by reference to
mechanisms at only one level (chemical, physical,
psychological, social) or the fact that we cannot
explain a person’s ability to think by ‘reference to
the cells that constitute them, as if cells possessed
this power too’ (Sayer, 1992, p. 119). With this in
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mind, Greenwood (1994) suggests that empiricism
and social constructivism either ‘ignore’ or present
‘impoverished’ explanations by confining the social
aspects of identity and emotion ‘to the social dimen-
sion of our theories or discourse about identity and
emotion’. He offers a realist theory that is indepen-
dent of socially constructed theories while still
recognizing the social dimension of identity and
emotion. Equally, he does not challenge or pre-
sent any ‘threat’ to the ‘objectivity of psycho-
logical theories . . . or their empirical evaluation’
(p. viii).
As already stated, a difficulty with social construc-
tivist language and mental illness is that in the past
there was avoidance in recognizing that some people
with a mental illness experience severe pain and
discomfort as a result of altered and/or disturbed
cognitive functioning (Mulvany, 2001). In highlight-
ing this issue, Busfield (2001, pp. 5–6) succinctly
states ‘social construction has become very loose and
imprecise and, because of its epistemological and
ontological connotations can generate hostility
towards sociological ideas about mental disorder
from doctors, patients and families who feel it rejects
the reality of the pain, difficulty and suffering
involved in mental disorder’. A possible way of
addressing this issue is through the notion of em-
bodiment (Seymour, 1998; Connell, 2002; Krieger,
2005), with a particular concentration on ‘embodied
irrationality’ (Mulvany, 2001). This allows a person
with a mental illness to make sense of their biologi-
cal experiences, while equally acknowledging the
experience within a social domain. This creates a
more sophisticated and informative understanding
of the experience of illness within a biological and
social context (Mulvany, 2001). Additionally, in iden-
tifying Rosenberg’s (1992) theory of the ‘social
framing’ of illness, Busfield (2001) suggests that this
offers an understanding of ‘illness [that] varies
across time and place, but does not suggest any
denial of the material reality of the phenomena that
come to be constituted as disease or disorder.
. . . whilst also recognising the importance of the
social processes . . .’ (p. 5), a position that is apposite
with the philosophical principles of critical
realism.
Critical realism and research methodology
Recent claims for critical realism as a metatheory and
methodology for research are convincingly argued
for by Bhaskar & Danermark (2006). In their words,
‘. . . critical realism is . . . the ontologically least
restrictive perspective, insofar as it is maximally inclu-
sive as to causally relevant levels of reality and
additionally maximally inclusive insofar as it can
accommodate the insights of other metatheoretical
perspectives. This, . . . the “double inclusiveness” of
critical realism’ (p. 294). Given the philosophical
constraints of positivism and constructivism, critical
realism supports a wide range of research methods
(Sayer, 1992, 2000). Both quantitative and qualitative
research methodologies are valued and the choice of
research methods should depend on the type and
focus of the study and what is hoped to be learned
(Sayer, 1992, 2000).
Sayer (2000) distinguishes between intensive
(qualitative) and extensive (quantitative) research
designs, and it is closely argued, that critical realism
through its encompassing ontology bridges the
dichotomy associated with both research approaches
and allows research to reach areas that were not pos-
sible within traditional approaches (Sayer, 1992, 2000;
Archer et al., 1998). Similarly,Danermark et al. (2002)
present a mixed model design for research that they
refer to as ‘critical methodological pluralism’, an
approach that combines both intensive and extensive
research practices.
Arguing for an interdisciplinary approach for eco-
nomics, Downward & Mearman (2007) demonstrate
how critical realist ontology and retroductive reason-
ing (retroduction) can be linked to a mixed-methods
triangulation. Retroduction as a thought operation
allows the researcher to move and obtain knowledge
of the properties that are necessary for a phenom-
enon to exist. This type of reasoning is about dis-
covering and explaining events by assuming and iden-
tifying mechanisms that are capable of producing
such events (Sayer, 1992). On the other hand, induc-
tive and deductive reasoning are concerned with con-
firming and giving reasons (justifying) for events or
phenomenon (Frauley & Pearce, 2007). Counterfac-
tual thinking is essential to retroduction, whereby the
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researcher’s experiences and knowledge and their
‘ability to abstract and to think about what is not,
but what might be’ is significant (Danermark et al.,
2002, p. 101). In so doing, the researcher is able to
move beyond a particular ‘ontic context’ to another,
thereby creating explanations that involve ontologi-
cal depth (Downward & Mearman, 2007). Central to
this approach is the ontological-methodological link
whereby researchers can integrate various research
traditions, and in the process strengthen the defence
of research within a critical realist understanding
(Lipscomb, 2008).Various disciplinary boundaries are
surpassed that engage and combine the best of both
qualitative and quantitative research methodologies
without taking on board their respective philosophi-
cal limitations.
Guided by a critical realist metatheory allows
various understandings and explanations for gender,
mental health and illness to coexist and avoids the
incomplete positions of positivism and constructiv-
ism. Therefore, various mechanisms at the biological,
psychological, social and cultural levels need to be
more clearly understood for an enhanced delivery of
care for gendered human beings with a mental illness.
In essence, gender and illness needs to be conceptu-
alized in a way that does not reduce the biological to
the social or vice-versa (Williams, 1999, 2006) and
offers an understanding of the world that is ontologi-
cally stratified with emergent powers. In other words,
critical realism through its ontologically focused
research has the potential to draw attention to new
ways for research and produce knowledge that would
not be arrived at using the traditional philosophical
frameworks.
Concluding comments
Most debate surrounding gender and mental health
have been guided either implicitly or explicitly within
a positivist or constructivist philosophy. The merits
and limitations of these established frameworks have
been outlined. The central argument of this paper is
a consideration of critical realism as an alternative.
The philosophical principles of critical realism merit
exploration within mental health related research and
practice. In particular, a critical realist philosophy
offers a framework that can explore gender and
mental health without dismissing that which is
already known. It allows the biological (sex) and
social (gender) domains of knowledge for mental
health and illness to coexist, without either being
reduced to or defined by the other. The challenge
now is moving beyond what is already known to the
domain of what is unknown for the development
of ‘comprehensive, cumulative and theoretical deep
explanations’ (Wainwright & Forbes, 2000, p. 274).
Arguably, this can be achieved for gender and mental
health within a critical realist framework. Moreover,
critical realism avoids a conflation of the ontological
and the epistemological and allows coexistence
for ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ within mental health related
research and practice.Additionally, as a philosophical
framework it brings together the known, and goes
beyond in our ‘desire to put the world back together
again, with critical emancipatory promise and poten-
tial to boot’ (Williams, 2003, p. 66).
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